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KIBBUTZ VALUES AND THEIR MODIFICATION
Not all values of the kibbutzim have been uniformly
affected by adaptive processes in the historical development
of these communities. Some are no longer seen as basic goals,
others have been creatively modified, still others remain
substantially unchanged. Before elaborating on these changes,
a brief description of the declared values of the kibbutzim is
needed. These values originally served to define the unique
social philosophy of the kibbutz and its way of life.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Part I of this article was published in the November 1974
issue of Administration & Society.
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VOLUNTARISM
The kibbutz is a voluntary socioeconomic community.
People join the kibbutz as a way of life by their own free
choice, rather than through compulsion of any kind. Kibbutz
members are free to leave the kibbutz whenever they wish.
There is no law enforcement mechanism in the conventional
forms. Instead, social control of deviant behavior is exercised
through public opiniom and standards of self-discipline.
Members obey the unwritten laws which embody the opinion
of the majority. Moral compulsion and appeal to the force of
conscience replace coercion. Solidarity and informality are
the expected bases of member-to-member relationships.
Nonformal public opinion plays the role of a social regulator.
EQUALITY
The kibbutz is an egalitarian micro-cosmic society that
provides complete social, economic, and cultural services for
its members. It is a community of real equality of oppor-
tunity, of sharing and enjoying the fruits of labor by
members, unrelated to position, output, income, or profes-
sion. All people in the community are treated as basically
equal. No formal privileges are given to members who hold
key positions in the community, nor to special families.
Consequently, there is no stratification in the kibbutz
system-but this still cannot prevent status differentiation of
people who are more or less influential. However, this is not
related to wealth or family. It is a society with no social class
distinctions, and it lacks individual differential material
rewards. Since the kibbutz offers primarily intrinsic rewards
to its members, and since these rewards are not cumulative,
they cannot offer permanent advantages to some people. The
creation of social strata which benefit from the &dquo;surplus&dquo; of
the material rewards is thus prevented. Here the kibbutz
operationalizes the value of equal sharing.
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DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The concept of direct democracy calls for the participation
of system members in decision-making in their own right and
not through formally chosen representatives. People make
the critical decisions in their own subgroups on issues
relevant to these groups, and in full town meetings on issues
relevant to the whole community. In the kibbutz, this is
implemented as follows. The kibbutz meeting is the supreme
authority. Each member is free to argue and vote, and has
equal rights. Unity of &dquo;powers&dquo; is manifested by the role of
the kibbutz meeting, which embodies the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial supreme powers of the community. There is
overlapping among members who participate in the kibbutz
meeting and those who implement its decisions. The kibbutz
system completely lacks formal judicial power. The kibbutz
meeting may act in certain rare cases as a judiciary body.
The daily life of the community is run by office holders
elected for definite periods of time, after which they are
rotated. Consequently, every key office holder who is
involved in the decision-making of the kibbutz is rotated. A
&dquo;manager&dquo; of a kibbutz at any level can neither promote,
reward, nor fire. He can only influence, lead, or initiate a
discussion on the relevant institutions of the kibbutz.
Direct democracy is manifested, too, through the maxi-
mum autonomy given to branch teams in problems relevant
to their work situations, and by the rotation and election of
the branch coordinator and the factory manager. The same
situation prevails in the social subsystem with elected and
rotated committees possessing maximum autonomy.
COMMUNAL FORMS FOR MAXIMIZING THE
INTERACTION OF INDIVIDUALS AS
WHOLE PERSONALITIES
Many founders rejected the established social system
because of its fragmentation of the individual in its formal
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role requirements on the one hand, and for its encourage-
ment of self-oriented individualism on the other hand. They
did not want people alienated from their work, or alienated
from one another. They wanted integrated personalities
capable of spontaneous expression, depth of feeling, and
personal fulfillment, but personalities socially rather than
egotistically oriented. The concept of the total inclusion of
personality as opposed to partial inclusion in Allport’s (1933)
critique of institutional behavior expresses a similar concern.
The founders saw a community in which people worked
together in attaining their own goals as a means for achieving
what Buber (1949) called the I-Thou relationship, rather than
the I-it relationship, the former being expressive and coopera-
tive, the latter exploitative. Asch (1952) has referred to the
relationship of people interacting in this fashion as shared
psychological fields. In implementing this value pattern, the
kibbutzim have attempted to get away from formal role
prescriptions and to bring up children in small groups in
which they develop their own patterns of interdependent
relations. Thus, privacy as a way of life is rejected as
smacking of anti-social individualism. At the other extreme,
superficial social interaction for purposes of political manipu-
lation, gamesmanship, or personal or economic advantage is
also condemned.
The early form of this belief in collective living emphasized
the oneness of the individual and the community. All
members were supposed to be completely identified with the
collectivity. Differentiation of individuals in property, dress,
and roles was to be avoided as expressions of egocentricity.
And, this lack of differentiation, as Durkheim (1947)
maintained, did produce a common collective conscience. To
be part of a community and to behave as one of its similarly
acting members was, and to some extent remains, a moral
value. This, it is common for kibbutz members to speak of
the youngsters in the community as &dquo;our children.&dquo; The loss
of a boy or girl is widely and deeply felt throughout the
community as if in fact the group were a large family.
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THE DIGNITY OF WORK
Among the basic moral ideas and values of the kibbutz
way of life is the dignity of physical work. A member
devoted to his physical work will gain community recogni-
tion. The kibbutz as a subculture has strong, positive built-in
attitudes toward physical, manual work. This value is well
internalized by members of the second generation, who were
socialized on the dignity of work very early in their lives
through the kibbutz method of education. It is reflected in
the young child who may strongly criticize his father for
working in a professional, nonphysical occupation in the
kibbutz. The child asks many times over why he is not
working in a &dquo;productive&dquo; (physical) job.
The kibbutzim try to perform all the needed work with
their own members and to avoid employing hired workers.
They perceive this as a value. With a shortage of manpower,
however, internal mobilization of their own people, in many
cases, does not solve the problem of an adequate labor force.
Hence, workers outside the system have been employed for
specific jobs. This practice is regarded as a departure from
values and as a temporary expedient.
ASCETICISM AND SIMPLICITY
The first generation saw a decadent form of existence in
the luxurious life of the privileged few in the societies in
which they were reared. The utopia they envisioned would
not be one of artificial embellishments of nature but of the
fundamental, natural expression of mankind. This assumed
two forms: one of an almost religious character of asceticism
and deprivation, the other an emphasis upon the simple and
natural gratifications in life. The ascetic would question any
activities of a joyous, indulgent character. The advocate of
simplicity would merely ask if they were direct and natural
expressions rather than the outcomes of artificial, commer-
cialized stimulation.
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FARMING AS THE BASIC ECONOMIC WAY OF LIFE
Related to simplicity and the dignity of work was the
belief in getting back to the land and to nature. The kibbutz
was to be a farming community in which people cooperated
in the primary task of conquering nature, of wresting from
the land an honest existence. People, it was felt, should have
roots in their natural environment. Interaction with the
world of nature was conceived as organic and fundamental in
contrast to an urban existence. If we were to update this
philosophy, we would talk in terms of the pollution of air
and water in our cities and the replacement of trees, grass,
and flowers by an asphalt jungle.
These early values of the kibbutzim movements were not
precisely defined nor systematically unified into a coherent
ideology. Equality, for example, meant different things to
different people. Hence the modification in value structure
for the utopian communities over the years was partly a real
change with respect to experience in meeting new situations
and problems and partly a matter of semantics in the
formulation and reformulation by different individuals.
Nonetheless, the basic values can be profitably considered
with reference to the amount and type of change they have
undergone, specifically:
(1) Values which have been neglected and replaced and no longer
are of significance to the kibbutzim.
(2) Values which have remained substantially unchanged.
(3) Values which have been creatively modified.
Values Neglected and Replaced
Farming as a way of life. The kibbutzim are consciously
and unconsciously becoming mixed patterns of farming and
industry. Industry is on the rise and many kibbutzim are
approaching the point where plants and factories will provide
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50% of the output of the community. This progression away
from farming is having, and will continue to have, a profound
impact upon the social fabric of the community. The change
is not as abrupt as might be anticipated in that farming itself
has become specialized and mechanized. The poultry branch,
common to most kibbutzim, is a highly specialized, mass-
production type of farming which is considerably removed
from the idyllic conception of the back-to-nature movement.
In turn, most of the industrial plants introduced are small
units with advanced technology which do not call for the
backbreaking, highly routinized work of the old, large
factory. Jobs are still routinized to a fair degree, but not
necessarily much more so than in the poultry branch. The
skill of the kibbutzim in the type of industry they select and
in the social organizations they devise for the plant will be
critical to the future of the kibbutz system.
Asceticism and simplicity. The economic success of the
kibbutz and its gradual move towards affluence has swept
away asceticism as a value in and of itself. Increasingly
people, especially the younger generations, see asceticism as a
value for survival and not as a goal. Even the older generation
as a rule did not see asceticism as desirable for their children
and were willing to sacrifice in order to give their children a
better way of life.
The improved standard of living was made possible by
economic success, but it was facilitated by the examples of
affluence in the prospering Israeli society. The kibbutz family
now has its own apartment and its own private shower and
toilet. It has a small electric refrigerator and other modern
electrical appliances. In almost all kibbutzim, each family has
its own radio and its own record player. It is not a luxurious
way of life, but it is a far cry from the heroic days of
hardship of the founding fathers. Now when kibbutz mem-
bers visit the city they are indistinguishable from city
dwellers as far as dress is concerned. Though asceticism has
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been replaced by a willingness to enjoy the good things of
life, simplicity as a value is still not outmoded. Adequate
provision for basic physical wants and good facilities for
social, cultural, and intellectual needs are one thing, and
luxury is another. This can be seen in the reactions to a
kibbutz which is building a new and fairly luxurious
communal dining hall and social center, equipped with air
conditioning. There is some disapproval of this project by
other kibbutzim because of the apparent extravagance
involved. But it is difficult to draw the line between necessity
and luxury. Common men today enjoy many things which
were denied to royalty of the past. Hence, simplicity as a
value is difficult to operationalize in a dynamic, progressive
society.
Values Which Have Remained Unchanged
Voluntarism. The utopian community has retained its
belief in a voluntary basis for the activities of its members.
They are free to leave, if and when they wish, and they can
receive some monetary compensation for their years of
service. They accept assignments voluntarily. There is still no
coercive law enforcement mechanism-no courts, no police,
no jails-and crime is a rare event. All key office holders such
as the economic coordinator and factory managers cannot
fire, promote, or reward people. The major appeal is to the
individual’s conscience. The major control mechanism is
public opinion.
Direct democracy. The concept of direct democracy
remains both a declared value and an operational set of
norms. The town meeting is still the supreme authority and
the branch teams make appropriate decisions in their own
sphere of competence. Leaders are directly elected and the
principle of rotation of elected officers is still observed.
Increases in size, complexity, and heterogeneity of the
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kibbutz, however, pose problems for the future with respect
to the town meeting and other aspects of direct democracy.
The largest kibbutz in Israel, with a membership of 1,000
(Givat Brenner), has maintained its weekly town meeting, but
it has added a form of representative democracy. A small
assembly of 70 members elected by the community meets
twice a week for discussion and solution of problems within
the framework of policies accepted by the kibbutz. The
principle of rotation is being tested by the growth of industry
and increasing specialization and training of members. In
some kibbutzim, the plant manager can remain in his post for
a longer period than was permitted for the manager of the
poultry branch. The kibbutz is committed to direct democ-
racy, however, and is attacking the problem of insuring its
operation at all levels of its activities as its structure grows
more complex.
Erik Cohen (1969), in his research, Comparative Study of
the Political Institutions of Collective Settlement in Isreal,
concludes:
Our most general and, indeed, crucial finding is that in the
kibbutzim under study, growth and complexity did not essen-
tially impair the working of kibbutz democracy. At least in the
kibbutzim under study, the system generally functions well, and
it continues to occupy a central place in the public life and the
decision-making process of the kibbutzim, under conditions of
broad participation of their members. Generally, the members
themselves expressed their satisfactions with the working of the
system in most of its respects.
But the study has nevertheless shown that direct democracy can
remain viable under conditions of modern complexity in the large
kibbutz, and does not inevitably undergo crucial and far-reaching
changes, though the focus of political process is effectively
transferred into more restricted institutions, dominated by a
small group of active and powerful members.
Values Creatively Modified
The most interesting change in values is the reformulation
which adapts to new situations but does not destroy the basic
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ideological principle involved. There is no compromise in the
literal sense of concession which violates the basic doctrine,
as in the case of compromised virtue. Rather the spirit of the
belief system is applied in taking into account changed
circumstances. The Supreme Court of the United States, for
example, in its famous 1954 decision that separate educa-
tional facilities for different racial groups were not psycho-
logically equal, was creatively adapting older constitutional
doctrines of egalitarianism.
Equality. The doctrine of egalitarianism is perhaps the
most fundamental ideology of the kibbutz. In one sense,
direct democracy and rotation of leaders is its political
expression. We are concerned here with equality in the
economic sphere, both of production and consumption.
Public rather than private ownership is still the basic pattern,
but there has been considerable change in the application of
equality, with respect to both consumer and producer roles.
Formerly, there was a mechanical egalitarianism in the
distribution of rewards in that all members received equal
amounts of strawberries and cream whether they liked it or
not. Increasing allowance has been made for individual
differences in need, taste, and aptitude. Women can use their
allowance for clothing and can select dresses from the
common supply made available by the kibbutz, or they can
purchase clothes in the cities from private shops. Within the
clothing allotment, the individual can decide the types of
items he or she prefers, as well as the particular item. But
individuals have only a limited cash allowance, and the
community controls the relative consumption for different
areas of life. Thus, the individual by himself cannot decide to
spend less on the education of his children, or less for his
cultural needs in order to dress better. The yearly budget is a
community decision which allocates proportional amounts
for given types of consumption. The individual influences the
decision-making in that he is part of the process, but once
[399]Katz, Golomb / INTEGRATION, EFFECTIVENESS, ADAPTATION I
consensus has been reached, his consumption choices are
within areas of products and services, not across areas.
The recognition of qualitative egalitarianism is in greater
evidence in the opportunities provided for members with
artistic and intellectual interests and talents. Individuals will
be allowed to substitute, for primary productive or service
labor, time spent in cultural pursuits or preparation for such
pursuits-for example, a writer, painter or sculptor may be
given half time off from his regular work to pursue his
specialty. The exact amount of time from his work role and
its distribution is worked out on the basis of community and
individual needs. In one of the large movements, the Kibbutz
Artzi, with 74 communities and 17,441 members (1968),
some 3.6% of the people enjoy some release from regular
employment in order to be involved in the various art fields.
The numbers of these are as follows:
116 sculptors and painters
50 authors
71 actors and other personnel in dramatics





All of these people are members of the artistic associations in
the Artzi movement. In many cases, the products of their
work are public adornments of the kibbutz for all members
to enjoy.
The special needs of members for advanced training and
professional education are also recognized. Members will be
sent to the training centers and educational institutions
maintained by the movements of the federation. They may
also be subsidized for study at Israeli or foreign universities.
The kibbutz cannot afford to honor the request of every
[400] ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / FEBRUARY 1975
applicant who wants university training. The community
makes the decision based upon its own resources and its own
priority of needs and the needs and abilities of the applicant.
In general, most kibbutzim stretch their resources as much as
they can to fill the request of a serious youngster who wants
professional training. In short, the kibbutzim have moved a
long way in recognizing that individual differences are a basic
fact of life and, in one sense, their optimization is the goal of
a utopian community. What they attempt to maintain is the
essential equality of opportunity for the development of
different human potentials. It is of interest in this connection
that their high schools have been changing in the junior and
senior years to provide more differentiation of studies to
allow for the variety of interests and aptitudes of students.
The principle of rotation has been creatively modified over
the years. The older notion was one of mechanical rotation in
all roles. Now the concept of professionalization is recog-
nized with corresponding changes to permit permanence in
certain skilled jobs. What has been retained is the basic
principle of rotation for elected officers in decision-making
positions. Professional people such as nurses, teachers,
engineers, and technicians, however, do not change their jobs,
although they are expected, after several years in their
professional work, to spend six months or a year in another
role in the community-as if on sabbatical. Each high school
teacher, in many communities, will give two weeks’ time each
year to whatever tasks are assigned him by the manpower
allocation board. Special chores and assignments such as
service in the dining room or kitchen are handled on a
rotation basis, though women still do most of the work in the
preparation of food. We have already mentioned the fact that
artists are often given half-time release from their kibbutz
jobs to apply themselves to their own interests.
The dignity of work. The original belief in the importance
of toil emphasized physical work. As any society develops,
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even a small society, the primary pursuits of farming and
secondary pursuits of industrial production are no longer the
only major sectors of employment. Tertiary activities of
service, communication, education, culture and research
assume growing importance. The kibbutzim have adapted to
change by recognizing the significance of intellectual as well
as physical work. Academic education, which had earlier
been replaced by more pragmatic kibbutz education, is now
perceived by some as relevant to the system. The creative
adaptation has been to seek some balance in which intellec-
tual activity and physical toil are both accepted and people
are expected to achieve some combination of them in their
lives.
Communal forms and personality expression. The original
solution to the problem of the one and the many was
community living of a noninstitutionalized type in which the
natural interaction of personalities in a common way of life
could prevent alienation, fragmentation, and exploitation.
With no hierarchical differentiation, group rather than
individual rewards, a real and immediate interdependence,
there would be no dichotomy between cooperative relation-
ships and individual expression, or so the theory went. Some
informal institutionalization might develop, but this would
be around a natural rather than an imposed norm. Allport
(1934) years ago showed that institutionalization gives a
steep J curve of restricted behavior, whereas without sanc-
Figure 1.
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tioned controls there is a wide distribution around a more
natural mode of behavior.
Allport’s suggestion then was to try, whenever feasible, to
have the institutional norm coincide with the personality
statistical norm. In this way there would be less external
constraint necessary to maintain an expected pattern of
behavior. The kibbutzim have in effect achieved this by
allowing norms to develop from below. But there are two
important objections which suggest that this is not a
complete solution of the problem of the individual and the
collectivity. First, though the norm may approximate person-
ality expression for many people, there are still those who do
not fall into the modal position on any given issue. The
answer is that the norm is not based upon an averaging of
opinions but upon group process which seeks to find a
position acceptable to all through full exploration and
discussion of the problem. This is possible, not only because
of the relatively small size of the group but because of
members’ mutual identification and interdependence in a
Gemeinschaft system in which their we-ness is stronger than
the opposition of individual wills. In the absence of sys-
tematic research data, it is difficult to say how much this
ideal is realized in practice, but observation would suggest a
high level of morale and community feeling in the kibbutzim.
A second objection is more serious, calling attention to the
number of areas or the amount of the individual’s lifespace
subject to the norms of the same community. In how many
areas of life does a social system require J curves of
conformity and in how many areas does it permit a wide
distribution of personality expression? The conventional
society, by institutionalizing in a formal way economic roles
and conformity to laws, can conceivably permit a broad and
free expression of individuality in other relationships. The
kibbutz, on the other hand, does not require submission to
authoritarian demands imposed from above, but, in effect,
through utilizing self-developed norms, controls all areas of
the individual’s life. In the former case, there is a division
between the public realm of life in which the individual
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conforms and in the private sector where his individuality can
assume various forms. In the case of the kibbutz, there is
little separation and while the individual voluntarily accepts
community decisions in which he participated, he is never
really free to depart from such decisions and remain in the
system. To insure this the individual is rarely alone. Children
are socialized in good part through their own peer groups and
togetherness is their way of life. Theoretically, the model
should work, save that human nature is not that logical.
Individuals still remain individuals in spite of shared fields
with their fellows. The needs for self-identity, privacy, and
self-development and actualization require a personal life-
space which does not completely overlap with the group.
Furthermore, kibbutzim values do take account of the whole
personality and recognize the need for the development of
the individual’s own potential.
To these factors should be added one other: namely that
the difficult years of physical survival are past so that there is
more freedom to relax informal pressures toward unity on all
fronts. As a result, the kibbutzim are less rigid about
ideological standards of communal living; they are more
discriminating in their beliefs about doing things together and
more tolerant of individual deviation. Communal living with
common showers and common toilets has been replaced by
private apartments with private bathrooms. The communal
dining hall is still basic, but people have their own kitchen-
ettes where they may prepare meals for the family sabbath
gathering, special occasions, or just when they want to get
away and be by themselves. Children are still brought up in
peer groups, but the tendency is to give each youngster more
space for himself. The role of the family has grown in
importance in comparison to the earlier days. This trend is
seen clearly in the expansion of extended families in the old
kibbutzim, with parents, married children and their offspring.
The ties between children and parents have grown stronger
and there is more individuality in family relationships than
was once the case.
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AN OPEN-SYSTEM MODEL OF THE KIBBUTZ
Kibbutzim can be characterized as falling into three basic
types: (1) a failure model, (2) a survival model, and (3) a
success model. The critical dimension for these types is net
growth in membership in relation to the population growth
of Israel over the years. Kibbutzim must hold a majority of
their kibbutz-born population and attract some new members
in order to maintain the system. A kibbutz as an open system
is in a precarious position if its size decreases while the
society increases. As a contra-culture, it loses its maneuver-
ability and capacity to maintain adequate social exchange
economically, politically, and socially with the larger society.
Isolated, relatively closed, and static utopian communities
have generally failed. It is small wonder, then, that the
necessity for continuous growth has become practically an
article of faith for kibbutz movements. Demographic stability
in absolute terms is potentially dangerous, and in relative
terms compared to Israel’s population figures, psychologi-
cally threatening.
A failure model, then, is one in which membership does
not keep pace with the growth of the larger society.
Increasingly, it loses its potential as an effective system in the
supersystem.
The survival model is represented by the community that
grows at approximately the same rate as the larger system. It
holds its own, not increasing its margin of power in relation
to the environment. It has good prospects for continued
survival but would be vulnerable to changes in its environ-
ment. The success model, by developing membership at a
more rapid rate than the surrounding system, is in a more
strategic position to be a leading subsystem in the total
structure (see Table 1).
We have discussed three areas of kibbutz functioning:
system integration, economic effectiveness, and creative
adaptation. They correspond roughly to the social, economic,
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TABLE 1
A MODEL FOR EVALUATING THE KIBBUTZ
and adaptive subsystems. We are taking net growth as the
criterion measurement of system integration and making that
the key variable in our model of failure, survival, and success.
Our assumption is that system integration is more critical to
the kibbutzim than economic effectiveness or creative adap-
tation for long-term system maintenance. Profitability is not
difficult to achieve, even in a cooperative system. Effective-
ness as measured by the profitability of various enterprises is
important but more at the level of a satisficing standard than
of affluence. Moreover, the interdependence of these two
factors of integration and effectiveness is not necessarily
more than that of a low positive correlation. And we assume
that the relationship, though in part circular, has a dominant
direction-namely that high integration leads to greater
profitability more often than profitability leads to integra-
tion. Continuing economic failure does, however, have
adverse effects upon integration. The third variable of
creative adaptation can be measured by the differentiated
value structure of the kibbutz in which undiscriminating
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rigidity represents poor adaptation, as does a loose, diffuse
conception of values. The latter reflects erosion of values and
loss of system identity. The former reflects ritualism or a lack
of differentiation between means and ends. Creative adapta-
tion, on the other hand, is the discriminating analysis of
essential goals and means for achieving them in a changing
world. Some solution has to be found which will avoid the
ritualistic approach reflecting the charisma of the movement
of the founding fathers, and yet not be a simple, pragmatic,
nonideological departure. It needs to be instrumentally
oriented, influenced by empirical evidence, but ideologically
concerned with system identity. We expect this variable of
creative adaptation to be a causal factor with respect to both
integration and effectiveness, and with low positive correla-
tions with effectiveness and moderate positive correlations
with integration.
Two examples of pairs of kibbutzim in the same geographi-
cal region and in command of similar resources illustrate the
importance of giving high priority to system integration. In
the one case, 2 communities founded some 33 years ago in
the same movement and with the same number of founders
now present different patterns. If we look only at profita-
bility, we would have to say that community A is definitely
more successful than community B because its standard of
living is higher due to a profitable factory. But it is not as
effective in holding people as community B, which has
outdistanced it by 100 members. The latter community is
not doing poorly economically, but it does not have the
affluent way of life of its neighbor. In creative adaptation it
would be higher according to the criterion of discriminating
values, but not very much so. In spite of the economic
success of community A, we would predict that it will have
more difficulty in surviving and developing in the future than
its neighbor because too much of the ingredient of system
integration is lacking.
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Another comparison can be made between kibbutzim C
and D, again of the same age, having the same original
population, located in the same area, and possessing similar
resources, though they are members of different movements.
They are approximately equal in profitability. Community C,
however, has more than doubled its original population and
now has 400 members, while community D has increased its
membership only slightly and has about 175 members. Here
there is a marked difference in creative adaptation with real
erosion in values in community D. Again the prediction
would be that the sustained growth of community C, in the
same environment as community D, argues strongly for using
net increase as the critical variable for predicting the future
success of kibbutz communities.
We would not, however, rely wholly upon past and present
membership growth in predicting the future. This would be
tantamount to merely extrapolating the growth curves. Two
additional considerations are necessary for predictive pur-
poses-one dealing with the system level, the other with the
individual level. At the system level, profitability needs to be
given some minor weight because, though maximizing profits
is not likely to be correlated with growth, meeting some
satisficing standard of profit is a necessary condition.
Creative adaptation would be given more weight since its
correlation would be expected to be higher on theoretical
grounds. In a dynamic environment, the kibbutz must have
an adaptive subsystem in order to relate effectively to
changing conditions and needs of its people. One manifesta-
tion of the operation of an adaptive subsystem is the
allocation of resources, both physical and human, for the
economic and social subsystems. Where there is a good
balance in utilizing the human resources of key people for
both economic and social roles, the community should grow.
Where there is dominant assignment of all resources to
economic functions, then the kibbutz may be profitable, but
it will not necessarily flourish.
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For adequate prediction, however, it is necessary to drop
to the individual level. Growth as a function of additions and
defections is a good summary measure of system attractive-
ness. Since conventional society may offer more materialistic
rewards to people and more varied stimulation, the kibbutz
which can outcompete the dominant society must possess a
social subsystem of forceful attractions. This can be ex-
amined in detail if we look at the individuals in various
kibbutzim and see how well they are tied into their
communities. Functional integration can be examined with
respect to the occupational distribution of roles, including
technical, specialized, and professional callings for both men
and women. With no spread of occupational opportunity, the
chances for good functional integration are lessened. Similar-
ly, we can examine the opportunities for training and higher
education for kibbutz roles. This is on the objective side, but
the satisfactions of the individuals with their tasks in relation
to their aspirations can also be measured.
Social and individual gratifications are also of central
importance in attracting people to the kibbutz and holding
them there. In the older kibbutzim, extended families have
developed so that leaving the kibbutz means breaking ties not
only with parents but with many other members of the
kinship group as well. For nonrelatives, there are the
advantages of personal relationships in depth and stability
difficult to attain in the mobility of large bureaucratic
cultures. This is one reason why about 75% of those born in
the kibbutz remain there. It is a critical problem for those
joining from the outside in that some empirical evidence
indicates that new members tend to leave or remain, not so
much because of ideology as because of gaining acceptance in
the group and forming satisfactory interpersonal relation-
ships.
On the emotional side, there is also the factor of individual
freedom of choice in a system emphasizing collective living.
In some kibbutzim, there is an overpatterning of life in that
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everyone is expected to do the same thing at the same time.
Thus, where there is a cultural event such as a musical
performance, the social club, which now includes a TV set, is
closed. The kibbutz can do more to provide for individual
choice within its own framework than it now does.
At the normative and ideological level, integration can be
measured by the overlap of individual values and system
values. We have already referred to the possibility of using
the mode of the normal curve as the basis for institutionali-
zation of some patterns rather than an arbitrary extreme,
which means constraints for the majority. Moreover, the
norm that is sanctioned by the group can be a wide band
rather than a point on a curve.
These various measures of individual integration could
supplement nicely the overall system figures on growth.
When they are strongly supportive of net gains in member-
ship, the prediction for the continuance of growth would be
much firmer. Where there are discrepancies, one would
suspect that the overall summary measure may reflect other
factors than individual integration. Such factors can be
accidental and transitory, though some of them can be more
constant, such as geographical remoteness from family, as in
the case of new members from the youth movement.
Essentially, then, we would expect that the condition for a
flourishing community is the goodness of fit between
individual aspirations and values and the norms and goals of
the group. The more members there are who find the
operating norms of the community an implementation of
their own attitudes and beliefs, the more committed will they
be to the system and the more eager to see their children
perpetuate the community. More complex structures can
grow on the basis of material returns and coercive sanctions,
but the kibbutz, by its nature, cannot afford much slippage
between group goals and individual objectives.
Basically, the issue for the future is the ability of the
kibbutzim to hold their own younger generation since they
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comprise the more stable part of new membership. They
constitute, moreover, about two-thirds of the net growth of
the kibbutzim. People of various ages who join from the
outside are much poorer risks as permanent members of the
communities.
In an older period, members selected themselves into the
system on the basis of common values, so there was assurance
of some overlap between individual values and group norms.
Now, however, there is a genuine problem for the younger
generation since there is no such built-in overlap between the
individual and the group. Integration of the second and third
generations into the system requires even more attention
than it presently receives. It is important that their differ-
ences-in perceptions, ideas, and aspirations-from the older
generation should not be polarized by their separation into
economic roles with social and public roles being monop-
olized by the older generation. The various committees and
even the leadership positions should be shared by all age
groups who are full members.
Rigidity and erosion operate differentially for the younger
and the older generations-and point to the central impor-
tance of creative adaptation for the second and third
generations. Rigidity is the greater danger for older people,
erosion for the younger ones. But erosion is more critical for
system maintenance than is rigidity. With erosion, system
values are lost; hence, there is little to hold people in the
community as long as there are attractive alternatives on the
outside. Younger people lack the fixation upon old system
goals and need to be tied into the structure in ways which
meet their needs. Rigidity does not make for growth, but it is
conducive to system survival. Many of the older generation
are rigid in some respects, but this has contributed to system
maintenance.
Attracting new members from outside the kibbutz move-
ments should not be ignored. In general, few systems are able
to offer compelling attractions for all types of needs and
[411]Katz, Golomb / INTEGRATION, EFFECTIVENESS, ADAPTATION
motives. What can be attempted is to meet some needs at a
minimal level of satisfaction and then maximize other sources
of gratification in terms of the strength of the system. Private
industry cannot compete with universities for researchers in
the area of providing a free intellectual climate. It needs to
provide some minimum of freedom and then maximize
research facilities and salary. Kibbutzim cannot provide
economic affluence or maximum freedom of choice. They
need, however, to increase their desirability on these counts
to some minimum in relation to the improving levels in the
larger society. Then their basic attractions of democratic
values operationalized to provide meaningful participation
and their opportunities for providing satisfactory interper-
sonal relations of support and acceptance need to be
optimized.
We have discussed three outcomes of environmental inputs
which affect the values of an on-going system: erosion,
rigidity, and creative adaptation. The first two, over time, are
dysfunctional. Erosion changes the nature of a system so that
it loses its distinctive character and becomes part of its
environment. Rigidity prevents adjustment and growth and,
in a dynamic world, militates against long-term survival.
Erecting a Chinese wall is no permanent solution for a
subsystem in a growing society. Theoretically, the processes
of erosion, creative adaptation, and rigidity need to be
considered in relation to the open-system model of social
structures. Inputs with potential for value change can often
be blocked by rigorous coding procedures from penetration
into the system, as in the case of the complete commitment
of system members to the old values in a literal sense.
Members act as if they had blinders with respect to new
information of an ideological character. In effect, there is no
adaptive subsystem for value inputs. The adaptive mech-
anisms operate only for economic inputs. Erosion also occurs
where adaptive mechanisms are lacking. In this case, there are
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ences. Inputs act directly on people as if there were little in
the way of system barriers. In the former case of rigidity, the
external forces are never translated to become part of the
system language. In the latter instance of erosion, there is
also little translation, but now the external forces gradually
take over the language of some of the subgroups in the
system. In both cases, there is no mediation or translation by
a boundary structure or adaptive subsystem. An adaptive
subsystem, either institutionalized as such or in the form of
accepted procedures for considering, analyzing, and working
out the relationship between established goals and new ideas
and problems, is necessary for a flourishing structure. The
interaction of the adaptive subsystem with new value inputs
can transform them so that resulting changes are consistent
with basic system goals-in other words, creative adaptation
takes place. Without such interaction, either rigidity or
erosion will result (see Figure 2).
In speaking in all-or-none terms-i.e., the presence or
absence of adaptive mechanisms-we have oversimplified the
matter. In reality there are degrees of such processes which
vary from weak and sporadic occurrences to strong and
sustained adjustive procedures. Another complexity is that
not all subgroups of a structure are affected equally by
change influences. Rigidity can be the characteristic reaction
of some subgroups-for example the older and more tradi-
tionally oriented people-whereas erosion may be going on
for other subgroups such as the nonideological younger
people. Specifically, something of this sort has been occur-
ring in a number of kibbutzim. The older generation,
thoroughly committed to traditional values, is often unre-
sponsive to changes in the external environment related to
their ideology. The second and third generations, without
emotional attachment to the beliefs of their parents, are
vulnerable to external influence. This is true partly because
there is only a weak adaptive subsystem which can help them
in interpreting new ideas within the framework of the
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declared goals and operational norms of the system. Where
adaptive mechanisms have little place in the scheme of things,
there is no agency for confrontation between societal values
and kibbutz values out of which could come a new synthesis
based upon an examination of facts and consideration of
logic and theory. There is no systematic, critical dialogue
between the generations and the young people are left
without guidance.
Thus far we have made specific reference only to direct
value inputs. But there is also another source of system
change affecting values in the acceptance of economic inputs
of technology and profitability in the marketplace. These
technical modifications can have the byproduct of systemic
change in the value structure. A plant, to be profitable, may
require more manpower than the kibbutz has available.
Hence, it turns to hired labor. Over time, however, its values
of nonexploitation and equality could be undermined.
Another more cogent example, because its importance is less
well recognized in kibbutz thinking, is the taking over of the
usual managerial structure when industrial technology is
introduced. Conventional managerial arrangements are hier-
archical and authoritarian and a departure from kibbutz
values. They need even more study than occurred when
technical and scientific methods were introduced into agri-
culture. Then a creative adaptation was found in branch
farming which utilized the new methods but still preserved
democratic forms and procedures. To prevent indirect proc-
esses of erosion resulting from economic change requires
adaptive mechanisms. These would make customary sys-
tematic investigation and consideration of the intended and
unintended consequences of alternative courses of action.
Most social structures are much stronger in their adaptive
economic subsystems than in their adaptive social sub-
systems. The institutionalization of adaptive mechanisms
pushes apart the economic from the social with a resulting
weakening of social adaptation and an erosion of social
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,values. In the kibbutzim, however, with little formalization
and with small numbers of people, economic changes can be
scrutinized both socially and economically by the same sets
of people. On the other hand, the lack of institutionalization
means that the members have to be eternally vigilant with
respect to plans for economic progress, lest the profitable
overshadow the ideological.
VALUE DILEMMAS
We can summarize the value problems of the kibbutzim by
recognizing that almost all values in social systems present
dilemmas. As values, they tend to be idealistically stated and
hence are never completely achieved. As ideologies, their
consistency can cloak contradictions in their operation. The
built-in dilemmas of the kibbutz system, suggested in the
above account, are listed below.
(1) Voluntarism implies freedom of choice for the indi-
vidual, but the range of choice in the cooperative community
is in many ways more limited than in conventional society.
The individual is free to leave the community, but the social
and physical environment within the system does not provide
an abundance of choice points. Moreover, the group makes
many decisions for the individual which he would make for
himself in other social settings.
(2) Just as voluntarism is a difficult principle to achieve in
practice, so too are the related goals of self-realization and
self-development. In fact, these goals depend upon freedom
of choice for the individual. The primacy of kibbutz needs
over individual needs can be a barrier to self-actualization. So
too is the lack of privacy in the small community in which
there is so much overlap between the public and private
sectors of life. Living in a kibbutz means being dependent
upon other members who share with the individual the power
to shape his life in almost all of his daily activities.
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(3) Equality in roles and in the sharing of group products
is contradicted by the fact that not all roles are equal and
allowances need to be made for different needs of people.
Women are not much better off with respect to jobs than in
conventional society. The rewards of special education and of
time to devote to artistic pursuits are not available for all.
(4) The dignity of work in kibbutz thinking makes for a
higher evaluation of direct productive effort than of intellec-
tual activity or of cultural pursuits. Yet the small community
cannot afford to become provincial and to ignore long-range
planning, research, and development.
(5) Direct democracy implies full participation by all
members, but those in key management roles and those in
professional positions have greater opportunities to affect
decision-making. With the growth of industrialization and its
demands for managerial and technical skills, added strains are
placed upon democratic decision-making.
MODERNIZATION AND
THE SURVIVAL OF THE KIBBUTZIM
Some sociologists regard the kibbutzim as anachronisms in
a modern society and predict their demise as Israel moves
toward modernization. The argument, in somewhat exagger-
ated form, runs as follows. In the prestate period, the
egalitarian ideology and the collective enterprises of the
pioneering kibbutzim played a functional role in the motiva-
tion, morale, and effective struggle for achieving an inde-
pendent state. The dedication of individuals to the com-
munity of interest in the absence of formalized structure was
critical in the early days. With the establishment of the state,
however, the movement is of questionable usefulness. In fact,
the traditional collective of prestate history is a conservative
and restricting factor in Israel’s development and egalitarian-
ism has become an ideological stereotype without real
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meaning. Modernization in developing countries has a num-
ber of essential characteristics.
First, the growth of Weberian bureaucracy with elaborated
role systems replaces traditional and personal relationships as
the basis of social organization. Universalistic rules and roles
become the reliable conditions for societal maintenance and
growth, rather than particularistic relationships. The rule of
law replaces the rule of men. Coordination and planning of
societal activities and the meeting of the needs of all cannot
be predicated upon the specific interpersonal relationships
within the small groups. The kibbutzim, with their emphasis
upon informal social structure, voluntarism, and direct
democracy, are no longer in the mainstream of the univer-
salistic trends of a large, developing industrial society. They
will either decline in membership or lose their distinctive
character as utopian communities.
Second, the growth of mass media and mass communica-
tion sounds the death knell for small groups in maintaining
their distinctive values, modes of limited communication, and
entertainment. Information relevant to the whole society is
readily available to all citizens and provincial interests take
second place. Values and ideals common to the society are
directly and indirectly instilled through newspapers, the
radio, and television.
Third, urban centers providing many types of services from
medical care to theaters grow at the expense of the rural
environment. The diversification of activity in employment is
paralleled by greater opportunities for cultural and social
stimulation in the urban setting. Increasingly, the kibbutzim
and moshavim, as small rural communities, cannot compete
with the cities in professional and job opportunities and in a
culturally rich life.
Fourth, as modernization proceeds, it makes available
certain types of freedom for many individuals in that they
are not tied to a given set of people or a given geographical
area. They are not confined to the work situation for
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establishing friendships, they may join the political groups
they wish, and they may find compatible associates for their
hobbies. They can shift jobs and places of residence. In the
first stages of industrial development, such opportunities may
be relatively few, but with the development of a more
affluent society, they are becoming more abundant. The rules
of the bureaucratic game have their own restrictions, but
they do not tie the individual inevitably to a single
subsystem; nor does membership in one subsystem neces-
sarily dictate membership in another system. Some individ-
uals may feel lost in such an impersonal world, but many find
freedom in escaping personal surveillance by an enclosing
primary group around the clock. Since self-expression and
self-realization depend upon the individual’s ability to choose
for himself, he may well prefer the freedom to manipulate an
organizational environment to fitting himself into the more
restricting mold of a small rural community.
There is merit in this contention that the kibbutzim
represent too much of a contra-culture to survive the modern
trends in a developing society. Basically, however, this view is
a great oversimplification and fails to see the many aspects of
modernization, dealing with past trends in large industrial
societies rather than their present dilemmas. Modernization
has not been the same for the United States, which lacked
the traditional institutions, as for England with its historical
and cultural traditions. Nor has it been the same in Sweden,
with its compromises between socialism and capitalism, as in
the United States. The factor of size alone is of significance.
Small collective farms or industrial establishments might not
be competitive in producing for a huge market in the United
States. In Israel, the small market does not demand the
economy of scale of the American scene. In fact, kibbutz
farming and moshav farming have been more productive in
Israel than has the farming of the private sector of the
economy.
The major weakness in the doctrine of modernization as
outmoding the kibbutzim, however, is the critical problem
[419]Katz, Golomb / INTEGRATION, EFFECTIVENESS, ADAPTATION
now encountered by post-industrial bureaucratic society.
There is a fictitious component in the assumption that
universalistic rules and roles and a government of laws rather
than of men supplants particularistic arrangements among
people. The sociological abstraction covers over the working
out of the system in terms of human interaction. The great
question in the highly developed bureaucratic systems is how
to reform the structure to break down its formalization and
to involve people in its operation and management. Large-
scale organizations are threatened by revolt from within and
the changes under consideration are in the direction of the
kibbutzim principles of egalitarianism, voluntarism, and
democracy. Thus the kibbutzim, instead of being a conserva-
tive force holding over from a prestate period, may be ahead
of the present trends of normalization and modernization.
The question, then, may be whether or not a country
necessarily has to go through a period of bureaucratic
modernization before it is ready to achieve democratic
decentralization. Leon Trotsky’s law of leaping development
would predict that not every society has to go through the
same evolutionary stages, but may be able to skip a given
stage. In other words, it may not be necessary for Israel to
become a set of a few centralized bureaucracies before
permitting decentralization and autonomy to its subsystems.
Large bureaucratic structures are confronted by the
difficulties of centralization in their control processes. The de
jure centralization is often de facto decentralization, with a
rubber stamping of decisions made down the line. Industrial
organizations often move toward decentralization in order to
have their component units face the test of competing
directly in the marketplace. One great advantage of the small
unit like the kibbutz is the ready mobilization of resources to
solve an urgent problem and the economy of this mobiliza-
tion. A large structure has difficulty in responding to
immediate challenges, and by the time it can make the
necessary rearrangements, the opportunity for effective
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action is gone. Hence, the large organization often fights the
old war, not the present conflict. The expense, moreover, of
making adjustments to meet changing demands is inordinate-
ly high for big structures, compared to the small unit.
Nor is there any compelling reason for assuming that a
small country like Israel cannot continue to develop as a
pluralistic society. There are genuine strengths in its pluralism
which can have the advantage of both bureaucratic structures
and voluntaristic subsystems. The advantage of the latter is
the high degree of dedication and motivation of the
members. This dynamic force has been directed at national
goals of defense production, political leadership, and cultural
activity. Such dedication is necessary in a small country
where manpower is not expendable. It is as necessary now as
in the prestate period. The growth of larger bureaucratic
structures in Israel may make this need more rather than less
salient.
Since a large system cannot operate through direct
democracy, it is important to know what forms of indirect
democracy are most functional for effectiveness and member
satisfaction. We would suggest that the relationship between
the kibbutzim and the Israeli nation furnishes a possible
model. The kibbutzim, as subsystems of Israel, provide the
psychological integration at the small-group level through
direct democracy and maximum involvement of their people.
They are, moreover, represented in the larger system through
the election of their people to public office and the selection
of their people for government posts. This mechanism ties
them into the larger structure as does their identification
with national goals. The representative democracy of the
whole may have some of its vitality furnished by units which
are not simple pieces of the larger bureaucracy but sub-
systems in their own right. Larger nations like the United
States have problems in achieving such integration because
the subunits, which could develop lives of their own and still
be tied to the larger structure, are lacking. Individual states of
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the union may have once presented such possibilities. They
no longer do. Israel is not only small, but it is unified by
immediate and common danger. Hence it needs to maintain
its pluralism, vitality, and dynamism, and here its cooperative
communities are highly functional.
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